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ABSTRACT: This article explores the ways in which French colonial authorities
met the life and death challenge represented by the re-emergence of yellow fever
at a time when physicians knew very little
epidemics in Saint-Louis-du-Senegal
about the etiology, diagnosis, transmission and treatment of most infectious and
parasitic diseases. The discussion focuses on changing strategies and policies
designed to address yellow fever threats, the attitudes and priorities of the authorities, the limits of 'colonial medicine' and the responses of people affected by
sanitary measures. The article argues that because of the ignorance of the etiology
and epidemiology of yellow fever, policies were misdirected and did not achieve
their primary goals. Even after the introduction of germ theory, the gap between
medical thinking and practice persisted for another decade. The African urban
working class and underclass were the first victims of this state of affairs. The
article also examines the conflict between the interests of public health, commerce
and privacy rights.
KEY WORDS: Senegal,

health,

colonial.

SINCE K. David Patterson's observation in 1974 about African medical
history as an untouched field, an increasing number of scholars have been
focusing their attention on the relationship between disease, Western medicine and colonial rule in Africa.1 Thematically, the main concerns have
related to the role of colonial medicine in the conquest of Africa,2 the social
* The materials for the article were collected in 1994-5 during fieldwork research in
Senegal and France assisted by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and from the
Joint Committee of African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the
American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford, Mellon and
Rockefeller Foundations, and in 2001 assisted by a Summer research grant from Bryn
Mawr College, and in 2oo2 assisted by the Lindback Foundation Minority Grant. I thank

them all for their support. I gratefully acknowledge the comments made on the earlier
draft of this article by Professors David Robinson, Harold Marcus, Beverly Heckart,
Gary McDonogh, Dr Fred Quinn and Philip Kilbride. I also wish to thank the
anonymous readers of the Journal of African History for their critical comments. Any
shortcomings are mine.
1 K. D. Patterson, 'Disease and medicine in African history: a bibliographical
essay',
History in Africa, I (1974), I47.
2 W. Cohen, 'Malaria and French imperialism', Journal of African History, 24
(I1983),
23-36; N. E. Gallagher, Medicine and Power in Tunisia, I780-z9oo (Cambridge, 1983);
Philip D. Curtin, Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in
the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1989); Philip D. Curtin, Disease and Empire: The
Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa (Cambridge, 1989); R. Headrick,
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history of several 'colonial diseases',' disease and urban segregation,4 disease
ecology and political economy,5 medical ideologies6 and the medical
profession.' Interpretations have also varied. Although most historians
have looked at biomedicine as a tool of empire and a means of social control,
they have disagreed on its effectiveness. Conservative interpretations have
presented the history of Western medicine in Africa as an account of its
successes in reducing mortality and in achieving population growth.
Liberal interpretations have tried to show that the record of colonialism on
health issues was a balanced one. Radical interpretations have emphasized
racialized health policies, health inequalities and the introduction of new
diseases.
These works have greatly contributed to our understanding of the
processes and structures that led to the imposition by the colonial state of
biomedicine as the official medical practice as well as the responses to it,
ranging from resistance and selective adhesion to accommodation and even
appropriation. Studies examining cities, in particular, have helped us
understand the factors that provided a rationale for change in urban policy

Colonialism, Health and Illness in French Equatorial Africa, 1885-1935

The list is suggestive,not exhaustive.

(Atlanta, 1994).

3 R. Packard, White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosisand the Political Economy of
Health and Disease in South Africa (Berkeley, 1989); M. Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A

Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940

(New York, 1992) ; N. E.

Gallagher, Egypt's Other Wars: Epidemicsand the Politics of Public Health (Syracuse NY,
1990); J. P. Bado, Middcine coloniale et grandes endemies en Afrique,

90oo-0-960:

lpre,

trypanosomiasehumaineet onchocerchose(Paris, 1996); E. Silla, 'People Are not the Same' :
Leprosy and Identity in Twentieth Century Mali (Portsmouth NH, 1998); Myron
Echenberg, Black Death, White Medicine: Bubonic Plague and the Politics of Public Health
in Colonial Senegal, 1914-1945
4

(Portsmouth

NH, 2002).

Maynard W. Swanson, 'The sanitation syndrome: bubonic plague and urban native

policy in the Cape Colony, Igoo-I909',

Journal of African History, i8 (i977),

387-41o;

E. M'Bokolo, 'Peste et societe urbaine ia Dakar: l'epidemie de 1914', Cahiers d'Etudes

Africaines,

22 (1982),

13-46; Maynard W. Swanson,

"'The

Asiatic menace":

creating

segregation in Durban, 1870-1900', InternationalJournal of African Historical Studies, 16
(1983), 401-21; Philip D. Curtin, 'Medical knowledge and urban planning in tropical
Africa', American Historical Review, 90 (1985), 594-613; C. Coquery-Vidrovitch,
Processusd'urbanisationen Afrique (2 vols.) (Paris, 1988); Odile Goerg, Pouvoir colonial,
municipaliteset espacesurbains, Conakry - Freetown des annees 1880 a 1914, vol. I: Genese
des municipalites(Paris, 1997); Odile Goerg, 'From Hill Station (Freetown) to downtown
Conakry (First Ward): comparing French and British approaches to segregation in
colonial cities at the beginning of the twentieth century,' Canadian Journal of African
Studies, 32 (1998), 1-31.
' M. Turshen, The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (New Brunswick NJ, 1984);

E. A. Eldredge, 'Drought, famine and disease in nineteenth-century Lesotho', African
EconomicHistory, 16 (1987), 61-93; S. Feierman and J. M. Janzen (eds.), The Social Basis
of Health and Healing in Africa (Berkeley, 1992).
6 A. Patton, Physicians, Colonial Racism, and Diaspora in West Africa (Gainsville,
1996); H. Deacon, 'Racism and medical science in South Africa's Cape Colony in the
mid- to late nineteenth century', in R. MacLeod (ed.), 'Nature and empire: science and
the colonial enterprise',
7

Osiris, 15 (200ooo), 190-20zo6.

John Iliffe, East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession (Cambridge,

1998).
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from early forms of cohabitation to urban residential segregation by race and
class. However, these studies - focusing on malaria, bubonic plague and
cholera - have emphasized the impact of the mosquito theory and the germ
theory of disease on urban colonial planning, but have neglected the role
played by the miasmatic theory of disease, which preceded it, in the genesis
of segregationist ideas and practices. Recent scholarship has underlined
the fact that steps taken by the colonial authorities before the introduction
of germ theory helped lay the foundation for segregation. In his carefully
researched book on plague in Dakar, Myron Echenberg pointed to the
importance of yellow fever in establishing 'important precedents' for disease
control well into the twentieth century.8 Another historian, Bruce Fetter, has
in a recent article stressed the contribution of the 'commonsense innovations' of British medical officers in saving lives, 'even though they had no
formal scientific rationale'.' This article will focus on yellow fever outbreaks
in Saint-Louis-du-Senegal and political and social responses to them. It will
contribute to the discussion on colonialism and urban residential segregation. In this regard, the study will complement the works of Philip Curtin
and Odile Goerg in the light of new advances in health science, and the works
of John Iliffe on the urban poor.10 The article argues specifically that
the miasmatic theory of disease and the measures that it inspired contributed
to the reduction of mortality, to the pathologization of those classified as
indigenes (working poor and underclass) and to the emergence of urban segregationist practices. The emergence of the germ theory of disease brought
the last two processes to fruition. The application of Western medical
knowledge in Senegal resulted in a division among physicians and between
colonial officials and municipal authorities, and in a conflict of interests
between public health, commerce, popular culture and privacy rights.
Evidence for this study is drawn from the archival materials, published
sources and oral sources related to Saint-Louis's experience with yellow
fever, one of the three 'exotic pestilential diseases', along with cholera and
plague, that necessitated the application of permanent sanitary measures.
Yellow fever occupied a special place in the minds of French authorities
because of the recurrent and disruptive nature of the epidemics, the high
mortality rates, the panic and flight that they provoked and the challenge that
they posed to the rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice related to freeing the
natives from the tyranny of disease over health, of instinct over reason and
of ignorance and superstition over knowledge, without engaging what
W. E. Connolly called the 'enigma of otherness'." Above all, yellow fever
provided the material for the construction of the Africans as natural carriers
of disease and a justification for segregation.

8

Echenberg, Black Death, 23.

9 Bruce Fetter, 'History and health science: medical advances across the disciplines',
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 32 (2002), 440.
10 John Iliffe, The African Poor: A History (New York, I987); Curtin, Death by
Migration; Curtin, Disease and Empire; Curtin, 'Medical knowledge'; Goerg, Pouvoir
colonial, municipaliteset espacesurbains.
1 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political

Paradox (Minnesota,

200oo2).
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In the second half of the nineteenth century Saint-Louis grew from a trading
post to a commercial port city, the capital of Senegal and, for a while, the
capital of French West Africa in the context of the emerging French empire.
It included the city-island and three peri-urban villages of Guet Ndar, Ndar
Toute and Sor. The early urban society included the Africans, a majority of
whom were Wolof Muslims, and the French merchants; from their interaction emerged a metis community, which would play a key role in commerce
and politics. Saint-Louis attracted an increasing floating population in
search of work or assistance. It remained the largest city in francophone West
Africa until 1914, with a dynamic civil society, electoral institutions and an
expression of citizenship which produced 'the biggest headaches' for the
colonial administration, as David Robinson has pointed out.12
However, Saint-Louis early on developed the reputation of being an
unhealthy place. Indeed, urban growth and the unequal distribution of
wealth and resources that accompanied it resulted in population growth
and environmental contamination. International trade and travel and the
inadequacies of public health policies were associated with the emergence
and spread of viral, parasitic and bacterial diseases, which killed or disabled
thousands of city residents.
Yellow fever is a disease of forest monkeys in Africa and the Americas. The
virus is transmitted by mosquito vectors as part of a monkey-to-mosquito
cycle. The disease is endemic in the jungle where it circulates between
monkeys, with occasional monkey-to-human transmission through infected
female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. These mosquitoes have also adapted to
living around human agglomerations and multiplied in containers of clean
water, leading to urban epidemics of yellow fever. Infected mosquitoes can
also travel in ships and trains and spread the disease. Yellow fever thrives
where there is adequate rainfall and warm weather. A person who becomes ill
presents terrifying symptoms that cause panic: jaundice, high fever, internal
hemorrhage and vomiting of black blood. It has been argued that the fact that
symptoms were mild in children conferred immunity to permanent residents
of endemic areas or areas frequently visited by yellow fever, thus restricting
the outbreaks of epidemics to the sudden arrival of large groups of newcomers
such as immigrants, soldiers, sailors, etc. This view can be found in Philip
Curtin's assertion that 'yellow fever in West Africa was a strangers' disease,
attacking those who grew up elsewhere'."l Curtin's interpretation was a
reflection of official mortality statistics that provided more details about
the Europeans and the 'assimilated' group than about the majority of the
natives, who had limited access to medical services. But recent scholarship in
molecular biology has revealed that a person who has been exposed to a viral

12 David

Robinson, Paths of Accommodation:Muslim Societiesand FrenchColonial

Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (Athens OH, 2zooo),98.
13 Curtin, Death by Migration, xiv, I30; Curtin, Disease and Empire, ro; Donald B.
Cooper and Kenneth F. Kiple, 'Yellow fever', in Kenneth F. Kiple (ed.), The Cambridge
World History of Human Diseases (New York, 1993), I 0ox; for a critique of Curtin, see

Fetter, 'History and health science', 427.
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Map i. Map of Saint-Louis.
or bacterial infection acquired protective 'immunity'
but against severe or life-threatening
symptoms.14

not against reinfection

14 Michael B. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York, 1998), i6; Stephen
S. Hall, 'Billions of powerful weapons to choose from', in Maya Pines (ed.), Arousing the
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Medical historians are still divided concerning the origin of yellow fever in
Africa or the Americas. A Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, identified in
1881 a mosquito vector as its agent of transmission, but his theory remained
in scientific limbo until it was verified in 1900 by J. Lazear, while the virus
itself was discovered in 1901 by Dr. Walter Reed. Both were members of
the American Yellow Fever Commission in Cuba.15 The first vaccine was
developed in 1937.16 Before these discoveries yellow fever remained the most
feared disease. Today, outbreaks of urban yellow fever still occur in some
regions of West Africa between May and October, and in South America
between January and April.
Yellow fever struck Saint-Louis several times in the second half of the
nineteenth century and produced thousands of casualties. Understanding
the career of yellow fever in the city requires an analytical framework that
focuses on agency and structure, and takes a critical look at the dominant
interpretational model of the colonial health officers that tends to obscure
some features of the re-emergence of yellow fever. As clinician and anthropologist Paul Farmer reminds us, the emergence of a disease can neither be
fully understood nor explained if one does not take into account the interaction between large-scale social forces, complex biosocial realities and local
factors and actors." This approach can also shed light on other crucial issues
that the outbreaks bring to the forefront of the debate such as scapegoating
and stigmatization or medical profiling, associated with fear and suspicion.18
Charles L. Briggs's concept of medical profiling has a great explanatory
power in that it introduces a dichotomy within the body politic between
sanitary citizens, who are expected to obey the laws and cooperate with
health authorities to control the epidemics, and unsanitary subjects, who are
not open to modernity and are likely uncooperative patients. By choosing the
path of resistance, the unsanitary subjects relieve the government from any
obligation to invest in their health.19
Yellow fever ravaged Goree in 183o and returned in 1859 and I866
without reaching Saint-Louis. But in 1867 it struck the city at the end of
August and spread rapidly, provoking a general panic, and overwhelming
the response capacity of the colonial authorities and the available health
resources. When the disease subsided at the end of October, it had killed
around 300 Europeans and hundreds of Africans.20 Before the advent of the
mosquito theory, there were two overlapping theories of the disease: localism
(or environmentalism) and contagionism.
Fury of the Immune System: New Ways to Boost the Body's Defense (Chevy Chase, 1998),
6-29.
15

Francois Delaporte, The History of Yellow Fever: An Essay on the Birth of Tropical

Medicine (Cambridge MA, i991).
16

W. Biddle, A Field Guide to Germs (New York, 1995); Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues,

andHistory.

17 Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues (Berkeley, 1999), 5.
s18For more details about stigmatization, see Philip Strong, 'Epidemic psychology: a
model', Sociology of Health and Illness, I12(1990), 249-59.
19 Charles L. Briggs with Clara Mantini-Briggs, Stories in the Time of Cholera: Racial
Profiling during a Medical Nightmare (Berkeley, 200oo3),xvi.
20

Archives of the Congregationdu Saint-Esprit,Chevilly-la-Rue (ACSE), Bulletin

Gendral, 6.42 (1866-67), 183-4.
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The localists argued that yellow fever had to do with local environmental
conditions, both natural and human-made. Epidemics were understood to
be caused by noxious miasmas emitted by decaying organic matters arising
from the cemeteries, stagnant pools from floods and torrential rains that had
transformed the streets of Saint-Louis into infected ponds, and the natural
environment surrounding the city - a flat swampy land, the mouth of the
Senegal River and the mixture of salty and non-salty water in the river
around the city. The frequent and terrible 'winds from the south' during the
summer months contributed to the spread of diseases. Other sources of
miasmas included waste from animal slaughtering, and urine and manure
from camels, mules, sheep, cows and horses left rotting in the streets and
public spaces, and along the docks. Localists did not see yellow fever as a
disease that could be transmitted from person to person; one could simply
inhale miasmas or be exposed to the sunlight and get sick.
The contagionists contended that yellow fever was caused by a kind of
poison which could be transmitted through contacts between people or
through infected buildings and objects such as clothes, merchandise, mail,
skins, leather, wool and feathers, irrespective of the local sanitary conditions.
Contagionists believed that yellow fever was not locally produced; instead, it
was imported to the city from Sierra Leone, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea or
Grand-Bassam via Goree and Dakar.21
Besides these general causes of fevers, both localists and contagionists had
identified other predisposing factors that they believed played a key role in
determining the pattern of infection, especially who would get infected and
die, who would recover and who would not get sick. These factors included
unsanitary housing, tropical heat, poor diet, fatigue, bad habits and excesses
and 'moral emotions' caused by frequent disputes resulting from crosscultural miscommunication in situations of 'forced interaction' with the
indigines - such as aboard ships - in which 'Europeans are obliged to refrain
themselves' from taking any action that would worsen the increasingly
strained race relations.22
Techniques used to deal with the yellow fever threat combined both
sanitationist and quarantinist approaches. The localists favored strategies
aimed at attacking the predisposing factors and improving sanitation and
hygiene enforced by municipal police, while the contagionists relied mainly
on quarantines, sanitary cordons, disinfection and isolation. The two schools
of thought were not incompatible, however, and did not form two permanent
groups. There were probably few committed localists and contagionists;
rather, the majority of public health officials found both explanations
complementary.23

The yellow fever policy of the mid-nineteenth century was formulated
from an environmental and narrow contagionist perspective. To improve
21Archives Nationales du Senegal, Dakar (ANS), H zo, Public Hygiene and Sanitation
Council (PHSC) meeting, Io Jan. 1868; for more on contagion and infection, see Peter
Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, z830-z930 (New York, 1999), 3-522 ANS, Section Afrique Occidentale Frangaise (AOF) I-4, Captain Doublet aboard
'L'Etoile', I860, 42.
23 ANS, AOF H 32-I4,
'Epiddmie de fievre jaune a Saint-Louis (23 juillet-z9
novembre)', by Dr. Martialis, 3-4, 6.
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the preparedness for epidemics, the public health officials recommended
measures that emphasized sanitation and hygiene, disinfection, the isolation
of European troops and an effective use of hospital services, as well as a
surveillance program that would enforce the quarantine regulations applying
to ships arriving from contaminated or suspected regions.24 Such measures
had serious disruptive effects and an intrusiveness that the authorities
underestimated, as I will discuss below. They were certainly convinced that
the outbreak response was effective, however. But yellow fever subsided
simply because of the extended cold weather from January through May,
which sent mosquitoes into hibernation, and the short life-span (less than
two months) of the female A. aegypti.
Efforts to control a disease about which little was known and to avoid its
recurrence heightened the anxieties that the French felt about Senegal.
While the yellow fever policy was implemented, a cholera epidemic ravaged
Saint-Louis in November 1868 and within a month it had killed i,112
indigenes - 5,000 according to missionary sources25 - and 92 Europeans,26
including Governor Pinet-Laprade, out of a population of 20,000. The
succession of outbreaks challenged the basic assumptions about the interaction between the French and the indigenes and provided the authorities
with a rationale for accelerating the change in urban policy from cohabitation
to racial and class segregation that had started a decade earlier. Health
authorities first targeted Saint-Louis's marketplace, which they perceived
as a source of miasmas generated by foodstuffs that were exposed to the
burning sun. In addition, the marketplace was described as the site of 'forced
agglomeration of individuals, almost naked, the majority of whom have no
notion of decency, who presented to the European population from the
metropole a revolting as well as immoral spectacle'.27 The marketplace was
transferred to Ndar Toute. The authorities next targeted unsanitary housing,
especially the shacks located in the city center that were seen as breeding
grounds for the disease, and decided to eliminate the indigenes from the city
center. Known as the bataille de la paillotte (war on shacks or thatch-roofed
houses) during Faidherbe's tenure in the I85os and I86os, the policy of
forced removals continued between I871 and 1873 to include the streets of
Saint-Paul in the north and Saint-Joseph in the south.28 The authorities
presented the policy as based not on race but on class, social status and
culture, especially the living standards and the degree of westernization or
modernity, which explains why it did not affect the metis and Muslim
merchant families. The policy was justified by the inability of the indigenes to
meet the requirements of the building codes in order to prevent frequent
fires during the cold season.
The evidence suggests that the policy of forced removals was actually
inspired by racial prejudice, however. Studies on race and ethnic relations
24

ANS, ]Voniteur du Se'ngal et Dependances, I867, 643; ANS/Hzo/Senegal,

meeting, Io-I I Jan. 1868.
25
26

PHSC

ACSE, Bulletin General, t. 6 (1868-9), 864.
Archives Nationales de France, Aix-en-Provence (ANFSOM), Series geographique
Senegal, xI 30, chief medical officer, Rulland, to governor, 3 Jan. 1869.
27 ANFSOM, Series geogr. Senegal, xII 9, Administration Council meeting, 25 Sept.
I869.

28 ANS, Moniteur, 25 Feb. I873, I.
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have shown that it is possible to 'fence in' a set of beliefs by periodically
admitting to exceptions, and to look down upon the majority of others in the
same category, who, presumably, are really 'typical'.29 The specific historical
situation of Saint-Louis, with the structural features of its commerce and
its complex political and civil society, can help explain why the metis and
Muslim merchant families were defined as exceptions and categorized as
sanitary citizens. Yellow fever and cholera outbreaks and the imagined or real
class character that they took led the health authorities to construct the
indigines as natural targets for particular diseases and as threats to the health
of the Europeans and people associated with them. In French thinking, the
indigenes had disqualified themselves from sanitary citizenship by refusing
to adopt French cultural values and ideas of progress, and were therefore
situated outside modernity and 'civilization'. They were 'different', 'other',
and the social difference was located in their customs, habits, lifestyles and
sexuality. Their women were seen littering and bathing naked in public, and
these practices were viewed as the result of 'self-negligence' and 'the absence
of sentiments that distinguish people who respect themselves', despite the
claim made a decade earlier by Hamet Ndiaye Anne, cadi (judge) of the
Muslim Tribunal, that the 'old habits have ended'."3 Being classified as
indigenes had serious implications concerning the ways in which they would
be treated by the colonial authorities, as the next epidemics revealed.
The 1878 yellow fever epidemic was part of the pandemic that affected
most Atlantic societies from Philadelphia and Memphis to Rio de Janeiro
and Freetown, as a result of globalization of trade and travel. It arrived from
Brazil in May, brought to Dakar by Le Niger and L'Orenique. The boats were
not quarantined.31 The epidemic was declared in Goree in mid-July and in
Saint-Louis in September, only after the infection had spread from the
indigenes to the Europeans. Despite the control measures adopted by the
authorities, ranging from quarantine and cordons sanitaires to health education,32 yellow fever spread in the city and, by December, it had killed 652
Europeans out of a European population of 1,300, including 14 Sisters of
Saint-Joseph de Cluny who cared for the sick, and an undetermined number
of middle-class residents and indigines.
Many factors contributed to high mortality. Immigration from France,
wars and famine in the countryside swelled the population of Saint-Louis,
now a city of I6,ooo residents. Urban growth had created vast problems
of sewage, waste removal, housing and water supply, and had increased
the quantity of breeding places for mosquitoes. To make sense of the crisis,
the authorities looked for scapegoats. Some in Paris resigned themselves
to the fact that, because of its climatic conditions, Senegal was especially
29

Hubert M. Blalock, Jr, Race and Ethnic Relations (Englewoods Cliffs NJ,

1982),

20-I.

30 ANS H 21, Special Commission

meeting, 2 July 1864; ANS H 20, PHSC meeting,

Io Jan. 1868.
31 ANFSOM, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce to the Ministry of Navy, 16 May
I878, in Series geogr. Senegal, xI 34, Navy Health Superior Council meeting of 30 Jan.
I879.
32 ANS AOF H 28-2, governor's decision no. I5 of 2 July I878; ANS AOF H 28-4,
decision of governor, no. I7 of 27 July I878; ANS AOF H 28-5, decree no. 16 of 28 July
I878; ANS AOF H 28-37, Ordonnateur to governor, 6 Aug. I878.
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vulnerable to yellow fever. Others pointed to bureaucratic deficiencies.
Others argued that only prevention could spare Senegal from another epidemic, especially the application to Senegal of the provisions of the law of
3 March i822 and the decree of 22 February 1876 empowering the sanitary
police to enforce quarantine.33 The final solution, some suggested, was the
separation between the Europeans and the indigenes as 'an element of first
importance from the point of view of hygiene'. But such a measure, they
realized, could not apply to the existing agglomerations, such as Saint-Louis,
Dakar or Conakry, where it would not find supporters among the merchants
who were primarily concerned with profit, not hygiene. Separation would be
possible only in future agglomerations,34 given that a significant number of
Muslim residents had been French nationals since I830.35 In the meantime,
the authorities focused on enforcing the quarantine regulations and other
sanitary measures. Soon, they would face another health threat that would
reveal that, despite their presence in the 'right' social category - that of
sanitary citizens - the metis and Muslim merchants did not necessarily share
the administration officials' perception of health risks and did not appreciate
the pathologization of the indigenes who were their supporters and voters.
In May 1879 fear and suspicion spread among the colonial authorities as
cases of fever and diarrhea accompanied by vomiting were observed among
city residents. The anxiety was justified not only by the coming of the rainy
season and the possibility of another epidemic, but also because of an influx
of hundreds of European troops into Saint-Louis. The unknown illness
provoked an intense debate during a key meeting of the Sanitary Commission
of 14 May 1879, presided over by Pierre Carpot, Ordonnateur, who represented the administration. In a report to the governor the day before,
doctors had linked the symptoms to the offensive smells from rotting fish
coming from Guet Ndar, and had called on the public health officials to
remove the 'focus of infection'. Pierre Carpot blamed Mayor Gaspard
Deves, from one of the leading metis families, for tolerating the 'general
unregulated fishing' in Guet Ndar and for his unwillingness to implement
the recent sanitary measures, which had provisions for a new location for fish
smoking at the extreme south of Guet Ndar in order to minimize the threat to
the city's welfare. Standing as 'the defender of the material interests of the
indigenes and those of the city', Deves took great pains to argue that the
fishing industry was not a threat to the city's health and that the indigenes had
the right to dry fish and earn a living. He reminded the participants that even
during the tenure of Governor Pinet Laprade (1865-9) no workable solution
could be found to the issue, and that the only viable alternative chosen by the
Municipal Council in 1878 was to prohibit fish smoking during the rainy
season. He presented contrary evidence indicating that those symptoms were
sporadic and were sometimes observed among the indigenes who ate fish
without enough spices and hot pepper during the cold season. He concluded
33 ANFSOM, Series geogr. S~negal, XI 34, Navy Health Superior Council meeting,
30 Jan. 1979.

34 ANS/H32, a draft of an unfinished letter, no author or date listed.
35 Dominique Sarr and Richard Roberts, 'The jurisdiction of Muslim tribunals in
in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.), Law in
colonial Senegal, I857-I932',
Colonial Africa (London,

I99I),

131-45.
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that the causes of the ailments - known as n'diank - could be found elsewhere. But where Deves focused on similarities - the same symptoms affecting the indigenes - Dr. Pierre-Adolphe Doue, acting chief medical officer,
saw the essential 'differences' between the Europeans and the indigenes. His
thesis was that different diets and different living conditions could not
possibly result in similar symptoms. He reported that three officers who had
recently visited Guet Ndar contracted the illness while crossing the Servatius
Bridge on their way back to the city-island. In response, Deves ruled out the
suggestion that the fishing industry would be the 'unique cause' of the illness. But a vote at the end of the debate on the issue of 'fish smoking as a
danger for the sanitary situation of Saint-Louis', and 'what to do about it',
resulted in a majority in favor of an immediate ban recurring every year on I
May.36 One of the consequences of the ban was the exodus of adult fishermen
in search of work as laptots (pilots) or traitants (commercial agents) along the
Senegal River.
The health crisis revealed not only the strength of the alliance between the
Deves clan and their African supporters and commercial allies in Guet Ndar
and Saint-Louis's hinterland, but also the jealousies of their competitors as
well as the underlying hostility between the administration and the Deves
clan - which would lead to Deves's revocation as mayor in i880 on the basis
of fraud charges."37The evidence suggests that the sanitation syndrome,
described by M. Swanson in South Africa, was at work in Senegal as well.
It referred to dealing with urban race relations in the imagery of infection
and epidemic disease.38 In Saint-Louis the yellow fever epidemic gave way
to an epidemic of fear and suspicion and to an epidemic of stigmatization
of the indigenes.39 Guet Ndar, the most populous and most disadvantaged
peri-urban village, was now seen as the focus of infection and the 'space
of death',40 where people, fish, beaches and even the air were infected and
contagious. 'Civilized' persons, or sanitary citizens, who went there returned
sick. It was the 'heart of darkness', to use a familiar expression.
In light of the preventive measures adopted by the public health authorities, many, like Governor Briere de l'Isle, hoped that the recent epidemic
would be 'the last human hecatomb'.41 But their hope was premature.
Indeed, yellow fever re-emerged in 1880 and 1881, producing respectively
8o and 503 victims among the Europeans, including the newly arrived
Governor De Lanneau, and creating panic, racial hysteria and a siege mentality. In the words of an eyewitness, the epidemic deprived the colony of its
'arms and head'.42 Yellow fever was now seen as endemic to Senegal; the
epidemic was understood as a simple transformation from endemic to epidemic disease under the pressure of climatic conditions and the natural and
social environment. Many officials became convinced that the repatriation to
36 ANS H 22, Sanitary Commission meeting, 14 May 1879.
37 On the revocation, see Robinson, Paths of Accommodation, lo9, 283 nn. 66, 67.
38 Swanson, 'Sanitation syndrome', 387.
39 For more on the subject, see Strong, 'Epidemic psychology: a model', 249-59.
40 Michael Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man: A Study in Terrorand
Healing (Chicago, 1987), 341 ANS AOF H 32-39, Inauguration du monument eleve iala memoire des officiers du
Corps de la Santei de la Marine pendant l'ipidemie de 1878.
42 ACSE, Journal de la Communauti, entry for 4 Aug. 1881.
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France of non-essential personnel before the rainy season would be the only
way to save European lives without generating unnecessary high costs,43
while others hoped that building ten public toilets and providing the police
chief with a horse for round-the-clock surveillance would suffice to keep the
city totally clean.44 Dr. Chassaniol, who saw himself as an 'impotent pioneer
of science', nurtured the hope that 'a variation of medication based on the
chemical science and the microscopic observations made by Pasteur could
lead to a rational treatment' in the near future.45 But some officials were
dissatisfied with the routine ways of responding to the epidemic. They argued in favor of a 'radical solution',46 including measures such as an automatic quarantine on all arriving ships during the rainy season, the expulsion
of the floating population and the total elimination of the indigenes from the
city-island. Radicals contended that the sanitary measures adopted to that
point were ineffective because they were always either partially implemented
or postponed, or simply rejected for a variety of reasons once an epidemic
departed."
With yellow fever taking such a significant toll on the lives of the colonial
city and creating terror, the government had to act more forcefully. Indeed,
the decree of 29 August 1884 that reorganized the Sanitary Service, especially
article I 13, title v, imposed an automatic annual quarantine of five days between I June and 15 December on all ships arriving from the areas situated
between the Pointe Sangomar and Gabon even if the ship captains had a
clean bill of health, since the region was perceived as 'dangerous' and the
ships 'suspect'. The provisions of the decree required a considerable number
of sanitation workers, the presence of a doctor aboard postal ships or any
ships carrying ioo or more Europeans for more than 48 hours, the interrogation under oath of ship captains on health matters and the building of
infrastructure (lazarettos, or isolation hostels, observation posts and equipment for disinfection). For those who contravened these measures, the
decree imposed draconian provisions, ranging from the death penalty to life
in prison and fines.48 But the authorities did not make any effort to evaluate
the challenges presented by such a costly surveillance program in terms of
qualified and motivated personnel, and financial and material resources.
Their decision rested upon the questionable assumption that sanitary
citizens would cooperate in epidemic preparedness. But the authorities
encountered opposition from both unsanitary subjects and sanitary citizens.
CONFLICT

OF INTERESTS:
AND

PUBLIC

PRIVACY

HEALTH,
RIGHTS

COMMERCE

Objections to the automatic quarantine came mostly from French, British
and Portuguese merchants who were angry about the interruption of all
43 ANS AOF H 32-36, ordinance of Governor de Lanneau, 29 July 1881.
44 ANS, General Council meeting, 17 Feb. I882, 48-9.
45 ANS AOF H 33-173, Dr. Chassaniol to Governor Canard, 7 Sept. i881.
46 ANS H 32, Hygiene Commission meeting, 25 July i88I.
47 ANS H 22, Dr. Desgrange to governor, 28 Apr. 1883.
48 ANS AOF H 2, sanitary police law, title II, art. 7-14, 4 Mar. 1822; decree
reorganizing the Sanitary Service in Senegal, titles I--XI,26pp, 29 Aug. I884.
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kinds of communication and exchange between colonial port-cities under the
new measures. Moreover, the authorities restricted the quarantine to imported merchandise and exported products. On 12 September 1885 British
merchants operating in Sierra Leone addressed a letter to V. Bareste, French
vice-council in Freetown, in which they expressed their concern about
the great inconvenience, loss of time and money, entailed upon us by the existing
quarantine regulations in the Rivers to the North of this port. In view of the fact
that there is no epidemic or disease of any kind prevalent (except the ordinary
African fever, of which there are only very few cases, these cases confined to natives
of Sierra Leone) we feel that your government would be justified in raising the
quarantine.49
Many of the merchants' complaints were justified. Ships were inspected
and quarantined for five to twenty-three days depending on the presence or
absence of morbidity or mortality at the port of departure or aboard the
ships, and on the nature of the commodities. Merchandise was unloaded and
disinfected at the lazaret, often resulting in long delays that were due either
to the incompetence and the unwillingness of the sanitary workers to fulfill
the required tasks or to inadequate infrastructure. Merchants and ship captains wanted to avoid medical inspections and quarantines at all costs. Some
ship captains were unloading their passengers before entering the ports."s
There were reports that British doctors in Sierra Leone and Gambia were
issuing fraudulent bills of health that had no mention of yellow fever, thus
giving an unfair advantage to British merchants vis-ai-vis their French
competitors. Very often, yellow fever was disguised by describing other,
less frightening diseases."51The reference to the 'ordinary African fever ...
confined to natives' can be understood in this context. It was presented as a
fever that was natural to Africans and did not require any special medical
attention, thus corroborating the idea that as long as a disease affected the
natives, it did not require intervention. In any case, British merchants' misrepresentation of the sanitary situation, inspired by greed or profit motives,
underlined the problems that the colonial powers had to resolve in their
effort to establish a regional surveillance system of outbreaks. Besides these
managerial problems, merchants raised serious doubts about the scientific
knowledge on which all these 'radical measures' and 'irrational practices'
were based, at the time when newspapers featured commercials about new
disinfection machines 'capable of destroying the microbes of yellow fever in
a few minutes at a temperature of more than i oo degrees'. 52 Navy officers too
contended that the quarantine was detrimental to the conduct of war in
Soudan because it affected the supplies to the troops.53
49 ANS AOF H 37-58, 'Merchants and traders of Sierra Leone' to Mr. V. Bareste,
12 Sept. I885.
50 ANS H 2, chief medical officer's report, 3 May 1889; ANS H 2, governor to interior

director, 27 May 1889; ANS H 2, E. Etienne, undersecretary of state for colonies to
governor, 29 June 1889; ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission meeting, 25 Aug. 1892.
51 ANS H 2, chief medical officer's report, 3 May 1889; ANS H 2, governor to interior
director, 27 May I889; ANS H 2, E. Etienne, undersecretary of state for colonies to
governor, 29 June I889; ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission
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meeting, 25 Aug. I892.

ANS H 4, SanitaryCommissionmeeting,25 Aug. 1892.

53 ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission, i Sept. 1892.
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Despite biomedicine's increasing role in shaping and maintaining the
colonial order, the pressure from sanitary citizens and various chambers of
commerce was such that the authorities in Saint-Louis and Paris had to
find ways to reconcile the interests of commerce and those of public
health. The outbreak of cholera in Saint-Louis in 1893, which killed 9oo indigenes - 1,500

to

2,ooo

according

to missionary

sources54

-

and

90-

Europeans,55 did not prevent Governor de Lamothe from recommending
the abrogation or at least the modification of articles i 13 and I 14 of the decree
of 29 August 1884. The annual quarantine was eventually lifted.56 In compliance with the resolutions of the 1892 Venice international convention, the
1893 Dresde international sanitary convention, the 1896 decree applied in
France and Algeria and the 1897 Venice international convention on sanitary
police, a new surveillance system that unified and consolidated the legislation
previously applied was put in place in 1897. It required passengers to obtain
sanitary passports. For suspect ships or passengers without sanitary passports, it imposed a quarantine of seven days for cholera and nine days for
yellow fever or plague at the lazaret, and the unloading and disinfection of
merchandise and the ship.57
The implementation of the 1897 decree created serious problems. The
infrastructure was inappropriate and, in many places, simply non-existent.
In addition, the majority of merchants voiced their opposition to the new
quarantine measures, which they described as 'inefficient and absurd', in
part because of the deficient organization or the underdevelopment of health
services. The Chamber of Commerce and the Sanitation Commission even
recommended the acquisition of disinfection machines as a solution to 'the
costly and unpopular quarantine'." The debate about the quarantines can be
understood in the framework of a larger debate that was going on in France
and was animated by the members of the Colonial Party, who were pushing
for a policy of mise en valeur of the colonies. In June 1899 the two-year-old
quarantine was in fact abandoned because of its negative effects on commerce, despite the doctors' apprehension that the return of the epidemic
'would be a calamity, and the ruin for the colony'." The doctors' fear was
not irrational given the unresolved problems of preparedness for epidemics.
On 19 May 19oo several cases of yellow fever were reported in Dakar.
Rumors and anxiety spread in Saint-Louis as residents feared that, in the
case of an epidemic, the quarantine and cordons sanitaires would eliminate
the limited opportunities for escape.60 On io June, the imposition of a
quarantine on Dakar and the confirmed news that yellow fever had spread to
Goree and Rufisque provoked hysteria among residents in Saint-Louis.
Yellow fever reached the city's garrisons on 18 July and unconfirmed rumors
ACSE, i46-A, Senegal Iv, Histoire du Senegal 1845-98, entry for 1892-3, 205.
ANFSOM, Series geogr. Senegal, xI d. 30, Chief Medical Officer H. Rulland to
governor, 'Rapport sur l'epidemie de cholera de Saint-Louis', 3 Jan. 1869.
56 ANS H 46, decree of 29 Dec. 1893 modifying the decree of 29 Aug. 1884.
57 ANS, Bulletin Officiel du Senegal, 1897, decree of 31 Mar. 1897, 343.
58 ANS H 4, Chamber of Commerce to Colonial Commission, ii Sept. 1898.
59 ANS H 22, chief medical officer to governor-general, 2 June I899.
s0 For more on panic, see J. B. Perry, Jr, and M. D. Pugh, Collective Behavior:
Response to Social Stress (New York, I1978), Ioo-I.
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circulated that the authorities were making plans for a rapid repatriation of
civil servants and troops. The onset of a dangerous situation gave rise to panic.
Merchants mobilized for flight. As new cases were reported, the authorities
finally used the tools at their disposal, especially quarantine, repatriation of
non-essential personnel and the liming of suspected houses to protect the city
and its 30,000 residents, including 1,5oo Europeans, from the epidemic.
Between July and September, when the last cases were reported, 228 residents, including 49 Europeans, had succumbed to yellow fever; hundreds
of Europeans were repatriated, including Governor-General E. Chaudie,
and some prominent civil servants. Many metis and other African residents
had also deserted the city.61 L'Echo de Paris reported that 'a complete
anarchy exists in Senegal since the hasty departure of M. Chaudie and the
shameful flight of some civil servants following the example of their chief; it
is unacceptable that the telegraph no longer functions'.62 Dr. Noel Ballay,
governor of Guinea, went to Dakar to replace Chaudie.63 The quarantine
was lifted in early January 1901. The 900oooutbreak proved that the city
was better prepared to handle a new epidemic crisis, as evidenced by low
mortality rates compared to previous years.
In their zeal to protect the city against the new outbreak, the authorities
targeted the unsanitary subjects they suspected of spreading the disease.
Thirty-five suspected Syrian peddlers operating between Saint-Louis and
other coastal cities were blamed for buying and selling contaminated clothes
previously used by people who became victims of yellow fever. They were
ordered to submit to medical examination and issued identity cards in order
to control their movement.64 Four single women working for the Sarrazin
family on Parquet Street as domestic servants, and who had friendly relations
with the crew members of the ship Saint Kilda, were blamed for the spread
of yellow fever. A local publisher and notable, Cornu, affirmed that the crew
of Saint Kilda brought the 'germ' of yellow fever and passed it along to the
women, who in turn contaminated the troops. Another source of infection,
he believed, was a small house located at the end of the same street where
other negresses de mauvaise vie (prostitutes) lived and were visited by French
troops. He felt that it was his duty to report these 'facts' to the authorities.65
The police chief, J. Avrial, confirmed these allegations and recommended
that Mrs. Sarrazin's house be disinfected.66 The authorities considered single
women dangerous: they were saturated with sexuality and, thus, a threat to
city's health.67

'6 ANS H 25, Municipal Council, 30 July 19o00; ANS AOF H 45-107, lists of deaths;
ACSE, 'Journal', entry for ii Aug. 1900, 385-6.
62 L'Echo de Paris, 5 Sept. 900oo, .
63 Jean Suret-Canale,
French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, I900-1945
(New York,

1971), 395.

64 ANS AOF H 41-3, decision of governor-general,
22 May x9oo; see also ANS H
4I-6, chief medical officer to governor-general, 27 May 1900oo.
Cornu to governor-general, 2I July I9oo.
65 ANS/H44/234,
66 ANS AOF H 45-235, J. Avrial to governor-general,
21 July 1900oo.
67 For more information on the 'hysterization of women's bodies', see Michel
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. I: An Introduction, trans, from the French by

Robert Hurley (New York, 1976), Io4-5.
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Throughout the epidemic crisis, opposition to anti-yellow fever measures
increased. The office of the governor-general was flooded with complaints
from all over Senegal and French West Africa about the negative impact
of the quarantine and cordons sanitaires on food supplies and prices of
commodities. The 'Europeans and inhabitants of Tivaouane' protested
against the suspension of the delivery of ice made in Saint-Louis described as
'a precious resource for the society' and 'the most precious auxiliary for
the doctor during the rainy and hot season'."6 By August eight Muslim
merchants from the same town requested permission to get kola nuts, their
'only resource', shipped from Rufisque. They expressed the fear that the
interruption of commerce and the lack of money for food and other basic
necessities would destroy their lives.69 Protests continued throughout
the summer months. Traders from the hinterland of Dakar, Rufisque and
Saint-Louis, who were directly affected by the quarantine measures, voiced
their opposition to measures they found 'radical'. In a strongly worded letter
to the governor-general dated 7 September 19oo, M. Meyer, the representative of the Societe le Syndicat du Soudan Franfais, opposed the rigorous
quarantine, which resulted in a great loss for the traders. He wrote that he
could not find one example in Europe or elsewhere in other colonies where
commerce was completely stopped because of the epidemic. He emphasized
that because the quarantine intervened between August and September, at
exactly the same time when the Senegal River was navigable until Kayes, the
flow of goods along the river was reduced dramatically.7"
The local Saint-Louis elite also opposed the quarantine. During the
meeting of the Colonial Commission of 28 July I900, Justin Deves shifted
emphasis from economic, administrative and psychological reasons to
medical reasons for the suppression of the quarantine. He contended that
physicians were helpless against a disease 'that escaped modern science and
empirical processes', and that yellow fever affected only a small percentage of
the urban residents (Europeans), but it interrupted the economic and social
life of all. Instead of quarantine, Devils argued, the best solution would be to
provide Europeans with medical leave and/or home care during the summer
rains. This proposal suggested that the metis and other Africans perceived
yellow fever as the 'white man's disease' that did not affect them, thus
reflecting the official thinking concerning racial susceptibility. Indeed, the
general consensus among health officials was that yellow fever provided
immunity to Africans who were infected in childhood; as a result, adults
who were reinfected developed only attenuated or mild symptoms that went
unnoticed though they remained 'active carriers of the epidemics'. It was
believed that Europeans, in contrast, did not have that acquired immunity;
the most vulnerable among them were not those who had survived yellow
fever and were 'seasoned', but the newcomers and those who were experiencing their second or third hivernage. This inequality before death was
summarized in a popular saying which stated that 'the bourgeoning of the
baobab leaves (hivernage) announced the imminent death of the Europeans,
68
1900.

ANS H 42-Io8, Administrator Decressac-Villagrand to governor-general, 4 July

* ANS AOF H
'Habitants of Tivaouane' to governor-general, 2 Aug. 19oo.
4I-114,
70 ANS AOF H 41-75, Meyer to governor-general, 7 Sept. 19oo.
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and the cold season that of the Africans'." The saying referred to the perceived European vulnerability to yellow fever during hivernage and African
susceptibility to waterborne and respiratory diseases during the cold season.
Deves was certainly alluding to this widespread belief. The Municipal
Council, dominated by the metis, also shared the same views and recommended that the sanitary measures affecting trade be implemented with
'wisdom and prudence'.72 But Deves's proposed solution to the quarantine
also reflected the bad blood between the Deveis clan and the administration.
The Deves brothers had sponsored the publication of a satirical newspaper,
called Le Reveil du Se'negal, that was very critical of the governor, prominent
civil servants and the Catholic Church.73 Despite the pressure from the
merchants and local elite, the quarantine remained in place. The economic,
social and psychological consequences of yellow fever were such that the
central administration in Paris decided to investigate the situation.
The Grall-Marchoux mission arrived in Senegal in February 90oi to
identify the causes of yellow fever epidemics and to suggest the solutions. Its
conclusions favored the hypothesis of the external origin of yellow fever, but
opposed the annual quarantine, incineration and disinfection. The mission
recommended new legislation consistent with the logic of 'modern science',
a reference to the discovery of the mode of transmission of malaria and
filariosis verified by Ross in 1898, which called for the destruction of the
mosquitoes and larvae and the isolation of the infected persons as soon as the
first signs and symptoms of the disease appeared.74 The administration
had to drain swamps, bogs, moats and other bodies of standing water in the
northern part of Saint-Louis, Sor and on Bop-N'Kior island which were
the breeding grounds for mosquitoes. The authorities needed to build new
garrisons and a new hospital with sufficient ventilation and light, and to
install screens on the windows in order to keep out insects and mosquitoes.
The new scientific knowledge also required that the authorities apply
insecticides in houses, prisons, meeting places and ships in order to prevent
further exposure to infectious agents. Other recommendations included
filtering the drinking water, and flushing refuse from areas of human
habitation.
Convinced that the natives and other foreign minorities (Moors,
Moroccans and Syrians) were 'active carriers of epidemics', thus 'dangerous
groups', the Sanitary Mission also strongly suggested a form of 'sanitary
segregation' in order to prevent European troops from interacting with
African troops or, at least, to authorize a limited interaction with an
indispensable fraction of their European cadres necessary for the daily
running of the service. In brief, the mission suggested an ambitious program
that required a commitment of considerable financial resources, estimated
at 4,908,000 francs.75 The measures reflected the sanitation syndrome that
71 See Georges Courreges and Fadel Dia, Saint-Louis du Senegal (Clermont-Ferrand,
1982).

72 ANS H 25, Municipal Council meeting, 30 July I9oo.
73 FrancoisZuccarelli,La vie politiqueSinegalaise(I789-z940) (Paris, 1987), 62-3.
74 See Constant Mathis, L'Eeuvre des Pastoriens en Afrique Noire (Paris, 1946), 9-14;
Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History, 45-72.
75 ANS AOF H 48-I, 'Mission Sanitairedu Senegal(fevrier-mars1901)'; ANS AOF

H 49-12, ColonialHygienicCommitteemeeting,6 Mar. 1901.
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characterized the colonial mentality and corroborated the idea that the germ
theory coexisted with the miasmatic theory during a transitional period
ending in 1914.76

Despite the hopes raised by the new knowledge and the formulation of
a rational sanitation program, when three new cases of yellow fever were
reported in early October i901, another great wave of fear and panic spread
throughout the city. The government reimposed the quarantine. Merchants
of Saint-Louis protested these 'excessive cordons sanitaires' and 'unnecessary draconian measures' that created hardship for the city residents. The
fishermen were unable to get out of their quarters for ten days. The officials
faced the possibility of social unrest if the chief medical officer did not
extend the perimeter of the cordon sanitaire to allow food movements into
the city.77

IMPROVING

EPIDEMIC

PREPAREDNESS

AND

THE

CHALLENGE

OF STIGMA

In early 1902 Governor-General N. Ballay died after less than two years in
office and was replaced by E. Roume, a former director in the Ministry of
Colonies, who had connections with the financial circles in Paris. Under the
new leadership, the government of French West Africa obtained fiscal
autonomy and a centralized bureaucracy. Roume's strategy in 1902 and 1903
included both preventative measures and a contingency repatriation plan for
non-essential personnel in case of medical emergency.
But the authorities' concern for epidemic preparedness was not matched
by city residents, who either ignored the new preventive measures or applied
them with skepticism. The marabouts (Islamic clerics) from Guet Ndar
protested against what they considered as the violation of their homes by
sanitary agents. Even the municipal authorities believed that health officials
were too severe in the implementation of sanitary laws and that such severity
was not justified. Unsanitary houses were burned down and fines for contravening sanitary regulations were issued during house-to-house searches.7
There were reports of corruption among sanitary agents because of these
draconian measures; some violations were not reported to the chief medical
officer. The agent Demba Seck is a good case in point. His area of operation
was Ndar Toute and Guet Ndar. Eyewitnesses testified that he received gifts
from residents who did not want their names to be reported as violators of
sanitary laws. He was fired."7
The ultimate success of the control measures came in 1909 with the
elimination of the main breeding grounds for mosquitoes constituted by the
swamps in the northern part of the city and a section of Sor. The cost was
7 Curtin, Death by Migration, 80, 107-9.
77 ANS H 25, Sanitary Council meeting, 21 Oct. 1901o; ANS AOF H 50-125, DeputyMayor Dumont to governor-general, 13 Oct. I901; ANS AOF H 50-I27, chief medical
officer to governor-general, 14 Oct. 1901.
78 ANS H 32, Annual Report I907; see also H 33, hygiene service physician to head
of health service, 31 Dec. 1909; ANS AOF H 54-31, Governor-General W. Ponty to
governor, 30 Mar. 191o.
79 ANS H 8, head of health service to governor, 15 Feb. 1913.
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estimated at 818,ooo francs.80 The sanitation program in the remaining part
of Sor and Guet Ndar and Ndar Toute

continued

between

19 11 and 1914,

when it was interrupted by the First World War. The medical authorities
were less successful in convincing sanitary citizens about the importance of
isolating the individuals who came down with fever in their homes or in a
hospital ward. Doctor Huot argued that such isolation could 'demoralize'
the patient and provoke 'a dangerous panic' among the European neighbors.81 Nevertheless, the combination of police surveillance, fines, health
education (propagande eclairete) and the implementation of the sanitation
program had contributed to the reduction of the incidence of yellow
fever, malaria and dengue fever, and it had reduced the exposure to garbage
and other waste. Yellow fever remained under control and no major
epidemic struck the city again until 1927. In the meantime, the health of the
European population and, indirectly, that of the indigenes, was increasingly
protected.
CONCLUSION

The growth of Saint-Louis in the framework of international trade created
serious health problems which highlighted the inadequacies of public health
policies. In this article, I have argued that the miasmatic theory and the
policies that it inspired provided health officials with a key tool in the management of the urban society and race relations. To make sense of the epidemics, the authorities adopted some sanitary measures that were influenced
by social prejudices. These measures, which identified targets for attack,
had profound effects on urban life. More and more areas of peoples' lives
came under the administration's control. The implementation of sanitary
measures revealed a conflict between the interests of commerce and those of
public health. The mosquito theory suggested that the solution was the destruction of the mosquitoes, their natural breeding sites and human-made
sites. But the paradigm did not change the stigmatization of the urban poor
and the imposition of a form of 'sanitary segregation'.
The evidence from Saint-Louis does not support the conservative views
concerning the 'successes' of biomedicine in reducing mortality in Africa
before the germ theory of disease and the availability of specific drugs. Rather,
other factors played a key role in the process, including better sanitation,
salubrious housing, the provision of clean drinking water and the general
improvement in living conditions that reduced exposure to pathogenic
microorganisms. From this perspective, the French and British experiences
with sanitation were similar from the beginning of the public health movements animated in France by Louis Rene Villerme and in England by Sir
Edwin Chadwick in the mid-nineteenth century; both had established a
correlation between poverty and disease and had underscored the role of
public health measures in saving lives. Some of the sanitary measures
adopted by the authorities in Saint-Louis contributed to the reduction of
mortality.
80 ANFSOM PI65-36, Sanitation of swamps in Saint-Louis: Situation of Expenses
Made, by the Director of the Public Works, 24 Dec. 1909.
81 ANS H 8, Dr. Huot to governor, 22 July 1913.
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Nor does the evidence support liberal accounts of an unqualified balance
in the record of colonialism on health issues. These accounts have been
based on the postwar period that witnessed the elaboration of development
plans inspired by the discussions on 'the native problem in Africa' that went
on in the 1920s

and I930s.

The population

decline

that accompanied

the

colonial conquest was not reversed until then. The evidence seems to corroborate the radicals' views related to infections and inequalities - based on
race, class, gender and geographical location - but not their assumption
centered for the most part on binary oppositions and class division along
racial lines.

